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NOTES
DILUTION, CONFUSION, OR DELUSION?
THE NEED FOR A CLEAR
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD TO DETER-
MINE TRADEMARK DILUTION'
I. INTRODUCTION
Trademark dilution theory, once proposed as a limited
additional protection for famous marks, has expanded and
been applied in a manner that threatens new products and
companies entering the global marketplace. Such an applica-
tion subverts the goals that trademark protection was original-
ly meant to achieve. Although dilution theory addresses a real
injury, it is conceptually difficult to apply.2 In addition, the
injury caused by trademark dilution is difficult to measure and
therefore difficult to quantify or prove.3 As a result, trademark
dilution theory has been applied inconsistently in the United
States4 and the European Union.' Broad dilution protection
as applied in the U.S. and the EU is an undesirable form of
protection that will stifle entrepreneurs in the global market-
place.
1. This note is intended in part as a response to a note recently published
by William T. Vuk, Note, Protecting Baywatch and Wagamama: Why the European
Union Should Revise the 1989 Trademark Directive to Mandate Dilution Protection
for Trademarks, 21 FORDHAM INVL L.J. 861 (1998), in which the author argued
that the English Baywatch and Wagamama decisions evidenced a need for the
European Union to mandate uniform protection for trademark dilution.
2. See Courtland L. Reichman, State and Federal Trademark Dilution, 17
FRANcISE L.J. 111, 112 (1998).
3. See Milton W. Handler, Are the State Antidilution Laws Compatible with
the National Protection of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEIALRK REP. 269, 280 (1985).
4. See Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution Law: At a Crossroad? Dilution or Delu-
sion: The Rational Limits of Trademark Protection, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 122, 128
(1993).
5. See Vuk, supra note 1, at 922-23.
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This Note will argue that the protection advocated by
dilution proponents in the U.S. and the EU is overly broad and
unwarranted in relation to the benefits it confers upon those
truly harmed by trademark dilution. An examination of deci-
sions in which European and American courts confront claims
for dilution reveals that most of the extended protection offered
under dilution theory could either be reached under traditional
trademark infringement analysis or, in other cases, should not
be provided at all. Part II will trace the origin and develop-
ment of dilution theory. Part III focuses on dilution theory in
Europe and its current application in the Benelux countries,6
which offer full protection for dilution, and the United King-
dom, which does not. Part IV will trace the development of
dilution protection and the policy behind the United States
Federal Dilution Act.7 It will also examine recent U.S. federal
cases in which courts interpret the Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act. Finally, in Part V I will argue that protection for
trademark dilution in the U.S. and EU should be limited as it
recently was in Ringling Bros. and Barnum and Bailey Com-
bined Shows Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.8 to require proof
of actual dilution, and not for a likelihood of dilution. I will
also argue that if Member States in the EU interpret the
Trademark Directive to mandate dilution protection for trade-
marks, the implementing legislation be interpreted to require
proof of actual dilution. Specifically, claimants should be re-
quired to prove causation and injury. I will posit that the U.S.
and EU should provide a uniform system of trademark protec-
tion for participants in the global marketplace, and that the
social costs of protection against a likelihood of dilution does
not justify its inclusion as a recognized form of trademark
protection.
II. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF
TRADEMARK DILUTION
Trademark dilution theory originally developed in re-
sponse to a perceived "gap" in trademark law.' Trademark
6. The Benelux countries are Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1996).
8. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
9. See Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion Of Trademark Rights: Is
A Federal Dilution Statute Really Necessary?, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 525, 528 (1995).
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protection was traditionally extended to prevent junior users
from using marks that are likely to confuse consumers about
the source of origin of the goods.1" But dilution theory devel-
oped to address another injury to famous marks, when a junior
user's mark does not confuse consumers but injures the dis-
tinctiveness of the famous mark itself.
Dilution theory originated in Europe and was introduced
in the United States in a 1927 article by Frank Schechter. 2
At the time of Schechter's article, trademark protection was
enforced only when a competitor utilized a misleading mark to
confuse consumers about the source of origin for the same or
similar goods. 3 Schechter advocated broadening trademark
protection to include instances where a junior user utilized a
mark on dissimilar goods, capitalizing on the strength of the
senior mark and weakening the mark's distinctiveness or abili-
ty to identify certain goods.'4 He cited the use of the trade-
mark "Kodak" used on bicycles," "Vogue" on hats, and "Rolls-
Royce" on radio parts. 6 Because traditional infringement
analysis has changed since Schechter's time to include any use
likely to confuse consumers whether used on similar or dissim-
ilar goods, today his examples would probably be actionable
under a traditional infringement analysis. 7 But the underly-
See also Vuk, supra note 1, at 873.
10. See Carl W. Lackert, Famous Marks: Dilution From an International Per-
spective, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE 87, 92 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trade-
marks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-4004, 1997). See
also Reichman, supra note 2, at 111.
11. See Handler, supra note 3, at 280. See also Port, supra note 9, at 528.
12. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV.
L. REV. 813 (1927).
13. See Moskin, supra note 4, at 124.
14. See Julie Arthur Garcia, Trademark Dilution: Eliminating Confusion, 85
TRADEMARK REP. 489, 491 (1995) (citing Schechter, supra note 12):
It is the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold
upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use on non-competing
goods. The more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper its impress
upon the public consciousness, and the greater its need for protection
against vitiation or dissociation from the particular product in connection
with which it has been used.
Id.
15. This example is from the English case thought to first recognize dilution.
See id. at 491 (citing Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. John Griffith Corp.,
15 R.P.D. & T.M. 105 (1898)).
16. See Schechter, supra note 12.
17. Under current U.S. Federal law, protection is provided for use of a trade-
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ing policy of Schechter's theory, the concept of protection for
the mark itself, has developed into the modern theory of dilu-
tion."8
Because dilution theory protects against harm to the mark
itself, rather than its ability to signify goods or services, it is
more akin to a property-based protection. 9 A senior user 'of a
famous mark can attempt to stop a junior user from copying or
"imitation without proving potential source confusion.20 The
distinction can be traced to the alternative theories on which
trademark law could be based, fraud or trespass.2' An advo-
cate of dilution protection described the distinction as follows:
The tort of irademark or trade name dilution sounds not in
deceit but in trespass and is a wrong damaging to an incorpo-
real property right in the sanctity of whatever distinguishing
quality may be associated with one's mark or name. The
right is to be protected against any trespass likely to dimin-
ish or destroy the distinguishing quality of that mark or
name.2
The modern definition of dilution occurs when the junior
user's mark "lessen[s] the capacity of a famous mark to identi-
fy and distinguish."' Under dilution theory, the mark's value
mark "on or in connection with any goods or services...which is likely to cause
confusion," 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1946) (this statute is commonly referred to as the
Lanham Act). See also Moskin, supra note 4, at 126, in which the author notes
that Schechter's examples would probably have been actionable under the Lanham
Act before it was amended to include protection for dilution.
18. See Frederick W. Mostert, Well-Known and Famous Marks: Is Harmony
Possible In the Global Village?, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 103, 132 (1996), where the
author states: "A dilution action is usually available where there is no likelihood
of confusion and in the absence of competition in circumstances where there is an
erosion of the communication or advertising function of the trademark." Id. See
also Garcia, supra note 14, at 491; Lackert, supra note 10, at 92.
19. See Moskin, supra note 4, at 124. See also Handler, supra note 3, at 273.
20. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR CoM-
PETITION § 24:93, at 24-164 (4th ed. 1997).
21. See Handler, supra note 3, at 273.
22. Handler, supra note 3, at 273 (quoting Beverly W. Pattishall, Dawning Ac-
ceptance of the Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, 74
TRADEMARK REP. 289, 309 (1984)).
23. McCARTHY, supra note 20, at 24-160 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 which
states: "the term 'dilution' means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark
to identify and distinguish goods or services regardless of the presence or absence
of competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or like-
lihood of confusion, mistake, or deception"). Id.
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as a signifier of quality goods or merchandise can be dimin-
ished if a consumer thinks of that mark when confronted with
a similar mark and that lessens the capacity of the mark to
remain distinctive.24 As a result, senior users of famous trade-
marks may be protected against copying or imitation whether
or not the use by the junior user is likely to confuse consumers
about the source of the goods.' Although a mark's ability to
signify the source of the goods may not be impaired, the mark
itself may be harmed by the association with inferior or offen-
sive goods or services." Marks may also be harmed by the
continued use on a wide variety of goods and services, there-
fore losing their ability to retain their distinctive character to
represent only one class of goods or services." These two com-
monly accepted forms of dilution are, respectively, tarnishment
and blurring.
A. Blurring
Blurring is said to occur when a consumer views a junior
user's mark and the consumer has a mental association with
the senior user even though she knows that the senior user is
not the source of the goods.' Schechter's classic example was
the use of Rolls-Royce on non-competing goods, which would
eventually lead to the inability of Rolls-Royce to signify quality
automobiles even if consumers did not believe that the compa-
ny produced the other goods. For dilution by blurring to
occur, it is not necessary that the products be similar or the
same or that the consumer be confused about the origin of the
goods, in fact that is what separates dilution from traditionally
recognized forms of infringement." It follows that it is not
necessary that the mark be rendered unable to identify the
goods, but that the capacity of the mark to be a strong identifi-
er of the plaintiffs goods or services be impaired."1
Although many early decisions that cite dilution by blur-
24. See id.
25. See Moskin, supra note 4, at 124. See also Lackert, supra note 10, at 92.
26. See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, at 24-165.
27. See id. at 24-160.
28. See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, at 24-162.
29. See Schechter, supra note 12, at 825.
30. See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, at 24-164.
31. See id. at 24-160.
1999] 663
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
ring confuse the issue and really cite examples of source confu-
sion,32 true dilution by blurring occurs before the consumer is
confused-the perceived injury is not to consumers but to the
mark itself.33 Protection for dilution by blurring is preemptive
and more extensive than traditional infringement, in which the
mark's ability to represent the goods, and the source of the
goods must be impaired.34 Because dilution protection is for
the mark divorced from its ability to perform its function, dilu-
tion protection can result in the senior user "owning" the word
or image.35 Resultingly, a junior user may not use a mark
that calls the senior mark to mind even if such use does not
impair the senior mark's ability to signify the goods it truly
represents.36
B. Tarnishment
Tarnishment is presumed to occur when a junior user
associates a senior user's mark with an inferior product or a
product that has negative associations.37  In theory,
tarnishment occurs if the value of the senior user's mark as a
symbol of high quality goods is diminished although consumers
do not believe that the senior user is in any way connected to
the offending material." Two "classic" examples of
tarnishment are a poster of the Coca-Cola trademark that
reads "Enjoy Cocaine,"39 and a pornographic movie in which
32. See id. at 24-162 (citing Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227
(N.D. Ill. 1996) and Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Div. of Travel Dev. 955 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1997) as examples of this).
33. See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, at 24-161.
34. See Garcia, supra note 14, at 491, on the origin of dilution protection in
the U.S.: "Professor Schechter argued that the dilution concept be made a part of
American trademark law so that marks could obtain protection as property rights
independent of the existence of a likelihood of confusion." Id.
35. See Reichman, supra note 2, at 113 where the author states: "[flor analyt-
ical purposes, the doctrine of dilution by blurring can be thought of as a legisla-
tive decision to grant the senior user of a trademark the exclusive right to enter
other channels of trade in which the senior mark is recognized if the senior user
so chooses." Id.
36. See id.
37. See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, at 24-165.
38. See id.
39. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc. 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y.
1972). Vuk refers to both this case and the Pussycat Cinema case (infra, note 40)
as examples of federal courts protecting against dilution before the Lanham Act
was amended. I include these cases because they provide examples of the type of
664 [Vol. XXV:3
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an actress wearing a uniform very similar to that of the Dallas
Cowboy Cheerleaders engages in explicit sex acts.4" Although
both these cases are often referred to as examples of federal
courts granting dilution protection before it was mandated by
the Lanham Act,41 neither of the opinions rely on the dilution
claim to grant relief, nor does either opinion evidence a thor-
ough understanding of the theory.
In the Gemini Rising case, a poster manufacturer sold
posters that were identical to the "Enjoy Coca-Cola" trademark
except that it read "Enjoy Cocaine." 2 The New York district
court was confronted with the applicability of a state law claim
for dilution added to a Lanham Act claim for likelihood of
"confusion as to the source or sponsorship of the poster."
This case is often cited as an example or dilution by
tarnishment, because the court stated that "although there is
no confusion of goods or passing off in the strict trademark
sense, there is a sufficiently clear showing of the impairment
of plaintiffs mark as a selling device because of plaintiffs
use." The opinion also asserted that many New York cases
granted injunctions as relief for a state dilution claim absent
any showing of likelihood of confusion." The court finally held
that the plaintiff deserved relief in the form of an injunction
under either the federal or state claim."
Although the district court in Coca-Cola found sufficient
protection I am arguing against. This issue is explored fully in Part V(D).
40. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd. 467 F.
Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
41. See Vuk, supra note 1, at 902 (citing Pussycat Cinemas), 919 (citing Gemi-
ni Rising). See also STEVEN J. SZCZEPANSEI, ECKsTRoMS LICENSING IN FOREIGN
AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS § 4.03, nn. 60,61 (1997) (referring to both cases as
examples of dilution by tarnishment); David S. Welkowitz, Oh Deere, What's to
Become of Dilution?, 4 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 1, 33 (1996) (referring to Gemini Ris-
ing as an example of dilution by tarnishment); Patrick M. Bible, Defining and
Quantifying Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using
Survey Evidence to Show Actual Dilution, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 295, 305 (1999)
(referring to Gemini Rising as "classic tarnishment case"); Danielle Weinberg
Swarz, The Limitations of Trademark Law in Addressing Domain Name Disputes,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1517 (1998) (referring to Gemini Rising as a "well-known"
example of dilution).
42. Gemini Rising, 346 F. Supp. at 1183.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1191.
45. See id. at 1192.
46. See id. at 1188-89.
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evidence to justify an injunction under the dilution statute, the
facts of this case also clearly demonstrated a likelihood of con-
fusion to support the federal claim.47 The plaintiff received
numerous communications from across the country concerning
the poster, which the court found to be persuasive evidence
that the public was confused about the source of the poster.4"
In addition, the plaintiff presented evidence of a mother who
was so enraged by the poster that she contacted a local news
station.49 The station also received similar calls from other
members of the community who threatened a boycott of Coca-
Cola because they believed the poster came from the compa-
ny. o Finally, Judge Neaher specifically stated that the plain-
tiff had demonstrated a likelihood of source confusion."s The
court never had to reach the dilution claim, because the plain-
tiff had already demonstrated injury through the evidence
establishing a likelihood of confusion.
In Dallas Cowboys, a New York district court again faced
a state dilution claim brought in conjunction with a federal,
Lanham Act claim.5" The opinion devoted eleven of the twelve
pages to explaining the standard for determining likelihood of
confusion, and ultimately found that the plaintiff demonstrated
the likelihood that consumers might be confused about the
sponsorship of the film.5" Then, in eight sentences, the court
explained that the evidence also supported the dilution
claim.' Judge Griesa found that "[i]f such activities are al-
lowed to continue, there will inevitably be a dilution, or whit-
tling down of the reputation associated with plaintiffs names
and marks5 5 but did not cite any evidence offered to support
this finding.
47. See id. at 1190.
48. See Gemini Rising, 346 F. Supp., at 1190.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 1990, n.89.
51. See id. at 1190.
52. See Pussycat Cinemas, 467 F. Supp. 366 (1979).





C. Modern Dilution Protection
Dilution theory has become increasingly accepted as an
additional necessary form of protection for famous trade-
marks. 6 In 1989, the European Union issued the First Coun-
cil Directive to Approximate the Laws of the Member States
Relating to Trade Marks 7 (Directive). In some Member States
the Directive is interpreted to mandate dilution protection.58
In 1995, the United States Congress amended the Lanham Act
to provide federal protection for trademark dilution. 9 The
statute now provides a federal remedy for the use of a mark
that lessens the capacity of a famous mark to distinguish goods
or services."0 With technological advancements such as the
Internet, satellite television and affordable internati6nal trav-
el, proponents of dilution view the protection as an important
weapon against free-riders who attempt to capitalize6 on
globally famous marks before they are used in a particular re-
gion.
6 2
III. THE DEVELOPMENT .OF DILUTION PROTECTION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE RESULTING TRADEMARK
HARMONIZATION DIRECTIVE OF 1989
In 1989, the EU Directive was issued in an attempt to
harmonize the laws providing trademark protection in Member
States.63 Because each Member State must implement this
56. See Reichman, supra note 2, at 112.
57. First Council Directive of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of
the Member States Relating to Trade Marks 89/104, 1988 O.J. (L 40) 1
[hereinafter Directive].
58. See Vuk, supra note 1, at 907.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1996).
60. See id.
61. See Mostert, supra note 18, at 104. The author notes that trademark
protection was traditionally only afforded to a company that provides goods or ser-
vices within the particular region of the junior user because competition between
the junior and senior user was required. The federal dilution statute specifically
discards the requirement of competition. In addition, trademark "pirates" may
register marks of companies they believe will eventually trade in their country and
then attempt to sell the marks to the senior user when it attempts to enter the
local market. See id.
62. See id. at 104. See also Lackert supra note 10, at 89.
63. There were several multilateral treaties providing limited trademark pro-
tection that led to the development of the Directive. Article 6 of the Paris Conven-
tion, enacted July 14, 1967, protects famous or well-known marks from infringe-
1999] 667
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
directive with its own legislation and its own interpretation,C
protection for trademark dilution has been applied inconsis-
tently.65 The Directive authorized Member States of the Euro-
pean Union to provide protection for marks that are confusing-
ly similar to established marks when used on similar goods. 6
Member states also have the option to provide protection to
marks that have a sufficient "reputation" when used on dissim-
ilar goods, but this protection is not mandated. 7 The perti-
nent part of Article 5 of the Directive reads as follows:
Rights conferred by a trademark
1. The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor
exclusive rights therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to
prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in
the course of trade:
(a) any sign which is identical with the trade mark in rela-
tion to goods or services which are identical with those for
which the trade mark is registered;
(b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity
to, the trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods
or services covered by the trade mark and the sign, there
exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public,
which includes the likelihood of association between the sign
and the trade mark.
2. Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor
shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his
consent from using in the course of trade any sign which is
identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to
goods or services which are not similar to those for which the
trade mark is registered, where the latter has a reputation in
ment, but only when used on identical or similar goods. The WTO TRIPs agree-
ment (World Trade Organization Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Agreement) expanded this protection to include protection for marks used on dis-
similar goods. The WTO replaced GATT, and currently has 120 members who
account for 90% of the world's trade. But the pertinent section, Article 16(2), re-
quires a likely mental connection in the consumer's mind between the junior user's
goods and the senior owner. This protection is already available under traditional
trademark protections in Europe and the U.S. because it involves a likelihood of
confusion. The Directive was an attempt to outline comprehensive protection
guidelines to which the Member States of the EU would comply. See Lackert,
supra note 10, for a detailed description of the historical development that led to
the Directive.
64. See Lackert, supra note 10, at 132.
65. See Vuk, supra note 1, at 923.




the Member State and where use of that sign without due
cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the dis-
tinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.68
The scope of protection that the Directive mandates has
been interpreted differently by Member States.69 Article 5(2)
arguably provides Member States the ability to protect trade-
marks from what would classically be considered dilution. °
But this protection is not mandated and the scope of protection
intended is uncertain.7' Because most Member States passed
implementing legislation mirroring both sections, it is relevant
to examine the scope of protection covered both by Article 5(1),
which "shall" be afforded, 2 and the protection offered by Arti-
cle 5(2), which "may" be afforded.73 It has been argued that
the EU should include in its Directive mandated protection for
dilution, because it is a necessary protection that supports the
policies underlying trademark law.74
A. The Benelux Interpretation: Full Protection for "Dilution"
The Benelux countries offer full protection for trademark
dilution, which includes any time that a junior user's mark
calls the senior mark to mind, regardless of whether the con-
sumer will be confused as to the source of origin of the
goods.75 The Benelux courts do not require confusion as to
source of origin, but find that the injury to the senior user
occurs when the consumer is made to recall the senior mark.
6
This "classical" theory of dilution is based on the belief that
68. Directive, supra note 57, art. 5.
69. See Wagamama Ltd. v. City Centre Restaurants P.L.C., [1995] F.S.R. 713,
728. See also Lackert, supra note 10, at 90; Vuk, supra note 1, at 923.
70. The "classical" theory of dilution is based on the belief that the mark,
simply being called to mind, will lose its distinctiveness and its power to signify
goods or services of a particular quality will be reduced. See McCarthy supra note
20, at 24-162.
71. See Vuk, supra note 1, at 889 n.149, (citing Paul Harris, UK Trade Mark
Law: Are You Confused?, 12 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 601, 601 (1995)). See also
Wagamama, [1995] F.S.R. at 727-28.
72. See Directive, supra note 57, art. 5 § 1.
73. See Directive, supra note 57, art. 5 § 2.
74. See id. art. 2.
75. See id. at 904 (citing Ethan Horowitz, FOREIGN TRADEMARK PRACTICE,
C602 A.L.I. 27, 50).
76. See id.
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the mark, simply being called to mind, will lose its distinctive-
ness and its power to signify goods or services of a particular
quality will be reduced."
The relevant section of the Benelux trademark law is Arti-
cle 13(a)(2) of the Benelux Trademark law 8 from which some
believe the European Trademark Directive was developed.79
The Benelux courts have interpreted this protection to include
any "likelihood of association" whether or not there was a
likelihood of source confusion.8" The inclusion of the phrase
"likelihood of association" in the Directive has led some to
believe the Directive intended to mandate full dilution protec-
tion, as in the Benelux countries.8 Others believe it was a
compromise to appease the Benelux countries when the majori-
ty of member states do not wish to grant this extensive protection.
2
77. See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, at 24-164.
78. Which states:
Without prejudice to the possible application in ordinary civil law in
matters of civil liability, the proprietor of a mark may, by virtue of his
exclusive right, oppose: any other use, of the mark or a similar sign, in
the course of trade and without reasonable cause, in such circumstances
as may result in damage to the proprietor of the mark.
Uniform Benelux Trademark Law, July 1, 1969, Belg., Lux., and the Neth., art.
13(A)(2), 704 U.N.T.S. 10099-10109.
79. See Main Changes in the Trade Mark Law, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
D-195 (1994) which states: "The Benelux Trademark law has largely inspired the
EC Directive and will consequently not be changed to a large extent." Id. See also
Vuk, supra note 1, at 907. But see Wagamama, [1995] F.S.R. at 728.
80. See Main Changes in the Trade Mark Law, supra note 79.
81. See Vuk, supra note 1. But see Wagamama, [1995] F.S.R. at 15.
82. See Vuk, supra note 1, at 889 n.149, (citing Paul Harris, UK Trade Mark
Law: Are You Confused?, 12 EUM. INTELL. PROP. REV., 601, 601 (1995)), where the
author notes that the Benelux countries tried, over opposition to have the "risk of
association" language included. The author concludes that this language is insuffi-
cient and should be replaced by language clearly providing dilution protection. But
by examining U.S. decisions that mistakenly rely on dilution theory, as well as the
English cases that provide protection without relying on it, this note reaches pre-
cisely the opposite conclusion. See also Wagamama, f1995] F.S.R. at 727. In this
case, the English court rejected the argument that the Directive was drafted to
mirror the language from the Benelux Trademark Directive, and as a result
should guarantee the same protection as the Benelux courts. The court noted that
according to an article written by Furstner and Geuze (who were part of the
Benelux delegation at the discussions that led to the Directive) the Benelux coun-
tries wanted the "likelihood of association" language from Article 5(1)(b) to be
included as a separate basis for protection. Then, they assumed, EU states could
provide for non-origin association protection as the Benelux countries do. Instead,
the language was included as a compromise and was intended as only a compo-
nent of the broader "likelihood of confusion" language. See id. at 727-28 (citing
H.R. Furstner & M.C. Geuze, Scope of Protection of the Trade Mark in the Benelux
TRADEMARK DILUTION
B. The United Kingdom's Interpretation: Protection Limited to
Instances of Source Confusion
Courts in the United Kingdom have interpreted the Eng-
lish legislation implementing the Directive, the Trade Marks
Act 1994,' to require a likelihood of confusion of source of
origin, whether the goods are similar or not. In Wagamama
Ltd v. City Centre Restaurants P.L.C. and Another,' an Indi-
an-themed restaurant opened using the name Rajamama's.'
Wagamama, an established Japanese restaurant sued for
trademark infringement."6 The plaintiff argued that the lan-
guage of section 10(2)(b)," which is identical to Article 5(1)(b)
of the Directive, 8 expanded British law to include instances
where the plaintiffs restaurant was "called to mind" but there
was no likelihood of confusion between the source of goods at
the plaintiffs and the defendant's restaurants. 9 Specifically,
the plaintiff argued that the final phrase, "which includes the
likelihood of association," increased traditional protection to
include instances where defendant's mark caused customers to
think of plaintiffs mark but did not think that defendant's
goods or service came from the plaintiff.8 In addition, the
plaintiff did not present evidence of actual injury, or that the
"mental association" caused such injury.9" This type of pro-
posed protection exceeds traditional infringement protection
available under English law because the damage is not to the
trademark's ability to identify the source of goods or services,
but rather protects the mark itself, regardless of whether its
Countries and EEC Harmonization, ECTA NEWSLETTER No. 15, (European Commu-
nities Trademark Association Newsletter, Antwerp, Belgium) Mar. 1989, at 10).
83. Trade Marks Act, 1994 (UK) [hereinafter UK Act].
84. [19951 F.S.R. 713.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. The pertinent part of the UK Act reads:
(2) A person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of
trade a sign where because...
(b) the sign is similar to the trade mark and is used in relation to goods
or services identical with or similar to those for which the trade mark is
registered, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public,
which includes the likelihood of association with the trade mark.
UK Act, supra note 83, § 10(2)(b).
88. See supra, note 68 and accompanying text.
89. See Wagamama, [1995] F.S.R. at 721.
90. See id. at 722.
91. See id.
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ability to identify goods or services is impaired.2
The English court declined to extend this protection. 3 It
found that since the likelihood of association is "include[ed]" in
the likelihood of confusion, it required confusion. 4 The court
declined to afford what it considered a monopolistic, copyright-
like protection when a mark is protected as other than a tool
for trade.9 It cited the preamble to the Directive96 to support
its position that the function of trademark protection is tied to
its use in trade.97 It refused to grant a monopolistic ownership
in words or symbols alone, when not connected to goods or
services. The court still found infringement in the traditional
sense, stating that when customers thought of the plaintiff
they were likely to think the product came from that source.9"
In Baywatch Production Co. Inc. v. The Home Video Chan-
nel,9 the plaintiff was the producer of a weekly television se-
ries.'0 0 Plaintiff sued for an injunction to stop defendant, the
producer of an erotic television series, from using the name
Babewatch for their series depicting a group of people in a
similar initial scenario to the Baywatch series, but who pro-
ceed to engage in sexually explicit acts. 1 ' The case differed
from Wagamama because the court initially found the goods or
services not to be of a similar nature, and so applied Section
10(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1994.1"2 Section 10(3)03 mir-
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 730.
95. See Wagamama, [19951 F.S.R. at 731.
96. The Preamble states: 'Whereas the protection afforded by the registered
trade mark, the function of which is in particular to guarantee the trademark as
an indication of origin. . . ." Directive, supra note 57, at 1-2.
97. See Wagamama, [1995] F.S.R. at 731.
98. See id. at 733.
99. [1997] F.S.R. 22.
100. See id. at 24.
101. See id. at 26.
102. See id. at 28.
103. The UK Act reads:
A person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of
trade a sign which
(a) is identical with or similar to the trade mark, and
(b) is used in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those
for which the trade mark is registered where the trade mark has a repu-
tation in the United Kingdom and the use of the sign, being without due
cause, takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive
character or the repute of the trade mark.
672 [Vol. XXV:-3
TRADEMARK DILUTION
rors Article 5 § 2 of the Directive, which Member States have
the option of implementing. But the court found that a likeli-
hood of confusion was also necessary under section 10(3). 04 It
reasoned that if the Act did not provide for protection for a
mark used on the same or similar goods when there was no
confusion as to source of origin (Wagamama), it should not
provide broader protection for a mark used on dissimilar
goods." 5 To support its position, the court cited the policy
justifications of an unreported decision interpreting Section
10(3) of the act in which Judge Knox found that without rele-
vant confusion no unfair advantage was gained nor was the
distinctive character or repute of the senior mark adversely
affected."0 6
The English .courts have also confronted the issue of
Internet domain name piracy. In Marks and Spencer v. One In
a Million and Others,"7 defendants registered Internet do-
main names' that consisted of the trade names of various
commercial enterprises.0 9 Defendants then attempted to sell
the names to Marks and Spencer, Burger King, etc."' The
court first acknowledged that it was unclear whether an action
under section 10(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 required a
likelihood that the consumer would be confused about the
origin of the goods or services."' The court found that "[ilt is
on the face of it strange that the likelihood of confusion should
be required (as it expressly is) when the infringement consists
in the use of an identical sign with similar goods or services,
but not where it consists of its use with goods that are not
even similar,""' and cited Baywatch as support for its posi-
tion that infringement under 10(3)"' requires a likelihood of
source confusion."4
UK act, supra note 83 § 10(3).
104. See Baywatch, [1997] F.S.R. at 30.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 31.
107. [1998] F.S.R. 265.
108. A domain name is the address of a website.
109. See Marks and Spencer, [1998] F.S.R. 265.
110. See id. at 269.
111. See id. at 272.
112. Id.
113. See supra, note 78, for the full text of Section 10(3), which mirrors §5(2)
of the Directive.
114. See Marks and Spencer, [1998] F.S.R. at 272-73.
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Ultimately, the English court granted the petition for
summary judgment and found that the question of whether
Article 5(2) (implemented by section 10(3) of the English Act)
required source confusion was irrelevant to the present is-
sue."5 The court declined to address this issue and stated:
The test in this context depends not on the way the sign has
been used but on whether a comparison between the sign and
the trade mark shows an inherent propensity to confuse.
There can, as it seems to me, be no doubt that this is the
effect of the use by someone else of the domain name
marksandspencer.""n
The court also noted that "[slomeone seeking or coming upon a
website called http//marksandspencer.co.uk would naturally
assume that it was that of the plaintiffs.""
7
IV. DILUTION PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995
Under increasing pressure to provide uniform protection
for trademarks throughout the United States to facilitate do-
mestic and international commerce, Congress amended the
Lanham Act in 1995 to provide Federal protection for trade-
mark dilution."8 Until then, about half the states in the
United States afforded dilution protection under state law.'
Although all the state dilution statutes were based on the
Model State Trademark Act,uo decisions interpreting the act
differed on the issues of whether dilution protection applied to
115. See id. at 273.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 271.
118. See Susan L. Serad, One Year After Dilution's Entry Into Federal Trade-
mark Law, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 215, 222 (1997).
119. See Garcia, supra note 14, at 493. In this article published in 1995 the
author noted that in 1995, twenty-seven states had dilution statutes, and all these
statutes followed the Model Act providing only injunctive relief. See id.
120. MODEL STATE TRADEMARK ACT, § 12 provides:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive
quality of a mark registered under this Act, or a mark valid at common
law, or a trade name valid at common law, shall be ground for injunctive
relief notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or
the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services.
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competitive or non-competitive goods, and more importantly,
whether it required a likelihood of consumer confusion.121 In
Judge Sweet's concurrence in Mead Data Central Inc. v. Toyota
Motor Sales USA Inc.,'22 the Second Circuit developed a six-
factor balancing test to determine whether or not a likelihood
of dilution existed." Other courts began to refer to this test
and use it as guidance to determine likelihood of dilution. 24
Section 43(c) of the amended Lanham Act"s provides fed-
eral protection against dilution of trademarks, regardless of
whether the mark is used on similar goods or leads to confu-
sion as to the source of origin." 6 For a claim to be successful
under section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, a mark must be "fa-
mous or well-known" and the defendant's mark must "cause
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark."'27 The legisla-
tive history suggests that Congress was motivated by the per-
ceived need for expanded, federal protection due to the growth
of the Internet and international commerce.' The amend-
121. See Garcia, supra note 14, at 496-98.
122. 875 F.2d at 1035.
123. See id. Judge Sweet looked at these six factors:
1-Similarity of the marks;
2-Similarity of the products covered by the marks;
3--Sophistication of consumers;
4-Predatory intent;
5-Renown of the senior mark;
6-Renown of the junior mark.
124. See Garcia, supra note 14, at 506. See also MCCARTHY, supra note 20, at
24-163. McCarthy criticizes factors 2, 3, 4, and 6 in relation to dilution claims
brought under the Federal Act because: with factor 2-a dilution action presuppos-
es that the goods are not in competition and there is no source confusion; with
factor 3-a sophisticated consumer might know the goods are from a different
source but dilution can still occur, factor 4-is irrelevant to whether the consumer
thinks of the senior user's mark; and factor 6-is also irrelevant because if a ju-
nior mark is also well-known it will be likely that it will cause consumer's to
"blur" the junior and senior user's marks, but if a junior user's mark is left alone
because it is relatively unknown it can still dilute the famous mark. See id. at 26-
164. I refer to this case to highlight the point that courts often misunderstand the
broad and general language of dilution statutes and misapply them when a tradi-
tional infringement analysis is appropriate. See also Port, supra note 9, in which
the author compares the dilution factors with the likelihood of confusion factors
from Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961) and
finds the likelihood of dilution factors all present within the likelihood of confusion
factors.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1996).
126. See Vuk, supra note 1, at 880 n.91.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1996).
128. Senator Leahy "hoped that this antidilution statute can help stem the use
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ment reads as follows:
(c) Remedies for dilution of famous marks
(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to
the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court
deems reasonable, to an injunction against another person's
commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such
use begins after the mark has become famous and causes
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain
such relief as is provided for in this subsection. In determin-
ing whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may
consider such factors as, but not limited to-
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the
mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection
with the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of
the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the
mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which
the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas
and channels of trade used by the mark's owner and the
person against whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar mark
by third parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the act of March
3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal
register."
Two important terms in the amendment are defined as
follows:
The term "trademark" includes any word, symbol, or device
or combination thereof-
(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in com-
merce and applies to register on the principal register estab-
lished by this chapter, to identify and distinguish his or her
goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured
of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing marks that are
associated with the products and reputations of others." 141 CONG. REc. 519312
(daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1996).
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or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even
if that source is unknown.
The term "dilution" means the lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,
regardless of the presence or absence of-
(1) competition between the famous mark and other parties,
or
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.130
The federal statute differs significantly from state statutes
on its face in two ways. First, it provides relief for actual dilu-
tion only, and not a "likelihood" of dilution."3 ' Second, it spe-
cifically defines the harm caused by dilution. 3 ' As interpret-
ed by the Fourth Circuit, these differences require claimants to
prove causation 3 and economic harm."M
B. The U.S. Cases Interpreting the Federal Act
Courts in the U.S. have consistently misinterpreted the
theoretical basis for dilution protection, resulting in inconsis-
tent and incorrect reliance on dilution theory. In I.P. Lund
Trading Inc. v. Kohler Co.,"' a Massachusetts district court
issued a preliminary injunction based on trade dress dilution
for a faucet design that was similar to that of plaintiff's, which
the plaintiff produced for thirty years and had won numerous
design awards."' The court found that there was no likeli-
hood of consumer confusion about the source of the goods and
instead found that "the capacity to identify and distinguish
VOLA faucets is likely to be lessened by defendant's use of the
Falling Water faucet.""7 The court relied on Judge Sweet's
six-factor test from the concurrence in Mead Data,"' cited
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
131. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting the language of the stat-
ute).
132. See id. at 460.
133. As opposed to speculation about a future likelihood.
134. To prove that the "capacity to identify and distinguish" has in fact been
impaired.
135. 11 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Mass. 1998).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 127.
138. See id. at 126. See supra, note 123 for the factors.
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the definition of dilution from 15 U.S.C. 1127,"9 and stated:
plaintiffs must argue that when someone deliberately pur-
chases a Falling Water faucet because it looks like a VOLA,
knowing full well the distinction, their product's identifica-
tion has been blurred. To succeed on its dilution by blurring
claim, Lund must demonstrate that 'the use of a junior mark
has caused a lessening of demand for the product or services
bearing the famous mark. 4'
Although the defendant in this case argued that applica-
tion of the federal dilution statute to this design unconstitu-
tionally and permanently extended the monopoly originally
granted by a patent,' the Lund court granted a preliminary
injunction on the basis of a likelihood of dilution by
blurring. It found that the first two factors, similarity of
products and marks (or trade dress in this case) were satisfied
in favor of a finding of potential dilution.' It also found that
the third factor, consumer sophistication, weighed in favor of a
finding of potential dilution because "purchasers may buy the
Falling Water, knowing they are not getting a VOLA, but
knowing, too, that they are getting a product of similar quali-
ty." " The fourth factor, predatory intent, was also found to
weigh in favor of the plaintiff.'45 Finally, the court found the
last two factors, renown of the senior and junior marks, to
weigh in favor of plaintiff.146 The issue of whether or not this
protection unconstitutionally extended patent protection indefi-
nitely was not addressed by the court in the proceedings.
In Panavision Int., L.P., v. Toeppen,' a California dis-
trict court confronted the applicability of the Federal Dilution
Act to a fact pattern similar to that of Marks and Spencer.
Defendant registered the domain names panavision.com and
panaflex.com. 48 The words "panavision" and "panaflex" were
139. See text, supra, at 17.
140. Lund, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 125 (citing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Com-
bined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 616).
141. See Lund, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 114.
142. See id. at 115.
143. See id. at 125.
144. Id. at 125-26.
145. See id. at 126.
146. See id. at 126-27.




trademarks registered by the plaintiff. After a preliminary
finding that the marks were sufficiently famous to justify pro-
tection under the federal statute, the district court held that
defendant's use of domain names as Internet access addresses
"diluted" plaintiffs marks, and granted summary judgment for
plaintiff.149 The district court found that "Toeppen was
able not merely 'to lessen the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services,' 15 U.S.C. § 1127,
but to eliminate the capacity of the Panavision marks to iden-
tify and distinguish Panavision's goods and services on the
Internet."' The court dismissed defendant's suggestion that
this type of protection hinders competition or grants trademark
holders "preemptive rights in domain names."151 It defended
its holding and the statute because the statute expressly re-
moves non-commercial use from this type of protection so that
it "protects parties who 'innocently' register a famous trade-
mark as a domain name (e.g., a citizen of Pana, Illinois who
registers 'panavision.com.' in order to provide a community
political forum would come under the exemption for non-com-
mercial use)."'52  -"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's reliance on dilution theory and af-
firmed the summary judgment.'53 The Circuit Court rejected
the defendant's contention that an Internet domain name is
simply an address and found that it served the dual purpose of
identifying the owner of the site.' The court determined
that Toeppen's use of the mark as an Internet domain name
"diluted" Panavision's trademark, "lessening [] the capacity of
the famous mark to identify or distinguish goods or servic-
es" 155 and cited numerous sources to support its position.156
149. See id. at 1304.




153. See Panavision Int. L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
154. See id. at 1327 (citing Peter Brown, New Issues in Internet Litigation,
17th Annual Institute on Computer Law: The Evolving Law of the Internet-Com-
merce, Free Speech, Security, Obscenity and Entertainment, 471 PRAC. L. INST. 151
(1997)).
155. Panavision, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing the statutory defi-
nition of dilution under the Federal Act).
156. See id. at 1325 (citing Carl Oppendhal, Analysis and Suggestions Regard-
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The court also expressed concern about the potential harm to
the plaintiff as expressed in another decision reached against
Toeppen for the same action.157
Recently, however, the Fourth Circuit took a fundamental-
ly different approach when applying the federal dilution stat-
ute. In Ringling Bros. and Barnum and Bailey Combined
Shows Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development158 the
court required proof of actual dilution to sustain the plaintiffs
claim.'59 The court based this requirement on the language of
the federal statute, and distinguished the federal statue from
previously enacted state statutes which only required a likeli-
hood of dilution for an injunction.6 ' It recognized the uncer-
tainty among commentators,' 6' but ultimately found that the
plain meaning of the statute required this interpretation. First,
the court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the word "ca-
pacity" in the phrase "capacity of a famous mark to identify
goods or services""2 implied protection for speculative future
harm." In addition, the court relied on the operative verb in
the statute to support its position. Under the federal statute,
the court noted, relief is available when a junior user's mark
"causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark"," not
for use "that 'will' or 'may' cause" dilution.'65
Next, the Ringling Bros. court found that the federal stat-
ing NSI Domain Name Trademark Dispute Policy, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. ME-
DIA & ENT. L.J. 73 (1996), 'once the domain name system was established, 'no-
body would have expected xerox.com to map anything but the Xerox corporation.'")
1in; See also Teletech Customer Care Management, Inc. v Tele-Tech Co., Inc., 977
F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (injunction granted to stop Tele-Tech from
using plaintiffs registered trademark as its domain name).
157. See Panavision, 141 F.3d 1316, 1316 (citing Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen,
947 F. Supp. 1227, 1240 (N.D. Ill. 1996) in which Toeppen also registered
plaintiffs registered trademark as a domain name and then tried to sell it to
plaintiff. "If Toeppen were allowed to use 'Intermatic.com,' Intermatic's name and
reputation would be at Toeppen's mercy and could be associated with an unimag-
inable amount of messages on Toeppen's web page").
158. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
159. See id.
160. See id. at 458.
161. See id at 461 (noting that although several commentators have differed
on how this difference should affect application of the statute, none have offered
textual support for their positions).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
163. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 460.
164. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1996).
165. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 460-61.
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ute required evidence of quantifiable economic harm and cau-
sation of that harm. 66 It found causation was required be-
cause the statute on its face only provides protection for actual
dilution-there is no mention of a "likelihood" of dilution. 16 7
And the proof of injury was required by the statute's definition
of dilution.' Otherwise, it reasoned, courts could avoid de-
termining the exact nature of the economic harm that is re-
quired to prove dilution.'69  Moreover, the "necessary
speculativeness of any inquiry into future states and conditions
has led some courts to allow the essential elements of 'likely'
dilution to be inferred as fact from the 'Mead factors,' or, even
more drastically, to be presumed from no more than the identi-
ty or sufficient similarity of the two marks."10 The court rea-
soned that a likelihood of dilution standard would either create
a monopoly right for famous marks, or allow the court to pre-
sume causation on the basis of evidence traditionally used to
prove a likelihood of dilution.' 7' It rejected the first proposi-
tion-that the dilution statute was meant to provide monopoly
rights for owners of famous marks-as clearly not intended by
Congress. 72 And it rejected the second possibility-that cau-
sation could be presumed-based on fundamental evidentiary
principles. 73 Although the court recognized the significant
166. See id. at 459.
167. See id. at 460.
168. See id. at 461.
169. See id. at 458.
170. Id.
171. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 459.
172. The court found that:
we simply cannot believe that, as a general proposition, Congress could
have intended, without making its intention to do so perfectly clear, to
create property rights in gross, unlimited in time (via injunction), even in
"famous" trademarks. Had that been the intention, it is one easily and
simply expressed by simply proscribing use of any substantially replicat-
ing junior mark.
Id. at 459.
173. The court noted that although proof of actual harm and causation has
been presumed by state courts when determining a likelihood of dilution:
it could not properly be used under a statute requiring proof of actual
harm already caused by use of a junior mark. Under basic evidentiary
presumption principles, the probabilities are not high enough nor means
of proof sufficiently lacking to allow such a presumption. [citations omit-
ted]$n
1
Id. at 459.60 (citations omitted).
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burden these requirements would place on dilution
claimants, 74 it upheld the district court's determination that
to establish dilution under the federal Act requires proof that
(1) a defendant has made use of a junior mark sufficiently
similar to the famous mark to evoke in a relevant universe of
consumers a mental association of the two that (2) has
caused (3) actual economic harm to the famous mark's eco-
nomic value by lessening its former selling power as an ad-
vertising agent for its goods or services. 5
V. ANALYSIS
A. The English Courts Do Not Interpret the Directive to
Mandate Dilution Protection
The English courts interpret the language of the Directive
to require source confusion, but still protect trademarks where
appropriate without hindering competition by focusing on the
potential for injury to the plaintiff. In both Wagamama and
Marks and -Spencer, the English courts protected trademarks
without interpreting the Directive to include protection absent
a showing of potential source confusion.176 The Wagamama
and Marks and Spencer courts protected the plaintiff because
they found a potential for injury,'77 and the Baywatch court
declined to extend protection when there was no such show-
ing."8 The reasoning of these decisions indicate why the lan-
guage of the Directive does not mandate protection for the
likelihood of dilution and the results indicate why such pro-
tection is not needed.
The Baywatch court concluded that the language of the
Directive does not mandate protection for marks used on simi-
lar or dissimilar goods where there is no showing that there is
a likelihood of confusion, 7 ' and the Wagamama court found
the issue was irrelevant because there was clearly such a like-
174. See id- at 460.
175. Id. at 461.
176. See Wagamama, [1995] F.S.R. at 733. See also Marks and Spencer, [1998)
F.S.R. at 273.
177. See Wagamama, [1995] F.S.R. at 733. See also Marks and Spencer, [1998]
F.S.R. at 273.
178. See Baywatch, [1997] F.S.R. at 32.
179. See id. at 30.
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lihood.' Although the Wagamama court declined to inter-
pret the likelihood of association language as expanding protec-
tion to include instances where there was no source confusion,
the court protected the senior mark by analyzing factors U.S.
courts use to determine source confusion. It reasoned that
when a mark is used to identify an inexpensive restaurant,
consumers may be more likely to rely on imperfect recollec-
tion.8  It also found that the sound was so similar that it
could heighten the probability of potential confusion.'82 If this
court had relied on classic dilution theory it would have
reached the same result, but without determining whether
plaintiff was likely to suffer any real injury. Instead, the court
would have focused on the potential injury to the mark itself.
The preemptive protection of dilution would have required the
court only to determine whether the junior mark caused cus-
tomers to think of the senior mark. But the court considered
the potential effect of the type of service, type of customer, and
the effect of the sound of the name. These factors mirror fac-
tors U.S. courts routinely examine to determine if a likelihood
of confusion exists. They are, respectively: sophistication of
consumers, similarity of the mark, and distinctiveness of the
mark.18
The Baywatch court found that the language of section
10(3) of the Directive,& which applies to similar marks used
on dissimilar goods, need not be interpreted to provide protec-
tion without a showing of source confusion." The court rea-
soned that since section 10(2), which applies to marks used on
similar goods or services explicitly requires a showing of poten-
tial confusion, it would not make sense for section 10(3), which
applies to marks used on dissimilar goods or services, to pro-
vide protection without such a showing.'86 The court recog-
nized two important points: that the "Babewatch" series was
broadcast on an adult channel that required viewers to con-
180. See Wagamama, 1995 F.S.R. at 733.
181. See id. at 732.
182. See id at 736.
183. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (9th Cir.
1961).
184. Section 10(3) was passed pursuant to section 5(2) of the Directive.
185. See Baywatch, [1997] F.S.R. at 30.
186. See id.
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sciously select it, 87 and that (after viewing an excerpt) there
was no real danger that viewers would think the products or
their source were in any way connected because they were so
different in nature.88
The Baywatch court also determined whether the
defendant's product was likely to cause any real injury to the
plaintiff by employing a likelihood of confusion test based on
factors examined by U.S. courts. In this case the court exam-
ined the similarity of the products, the channels of trade,'89
and the lack of evidence of actual confusion when the product
had been on the market for over a year. 90 This analysis re-
quired deeper reasoning than a determination whether the
defendant's product might "tarnish" the plaintiffs trademark.
A court can find tarnishment if the offending product may
cause consumers to have negative associations with the senior
user's product.' 9 ' But when the court considered the method
of receiving the product and the nature of the products them-
selves, it found that no injury was likely to occur. The court
also observed that this ruling was only on a request for a pre-
liminary injunction, and in no way prevented plaintiff from
suing for damages if it could prove injury in the future. 92 It
found no likelihood of injury to the plaintiff, and without rely-
ing on the broad protection available under dilution theory,
kept both products on the market without impairing the
plaintiffs ability to recover damages if a quantifiable injury
could be proven in the future.
Based on an almost identical fact pattern as the U.S.
Panavision cases, the English court in the case of Marks and
Spencer provided protection for trademarks used as Internet
domain names without relying on the vague and broad protec-
tion afforded by a likelihood of dilution standard.' The rea-
soning of this case exemplifies the fact that Member States
need not interpret the Directive to provide protection when
there is no potential for source confusion (classic dilution) to
protect companies participating in the growing field of Internet
187. See id.
188. See id. at 28.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 29.
191. Which in this case is conceivable.
192. See Baywatch, [19971 F.S.R. at 33.
193. See Marks and Spencer, [1998] F.S.R. 265.
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commerce. The facts of this case were similar to the facts in
the above U.S. domain name cases. But the English court
found that it was likely that any consumer who types in the
name of a famous mark and receives a response would assume
that the user most commonly associated with the mark had
provided-the response.' The Marks and Spencer court found
a likelihood of confusion of source of origin, and issued the
injunction on a traditional infringement analysis.9 ' The Eng-
lish court preserved the fundamental function of traditional
trademark infringement protection, to protect consumers from
the confusion or misperception that the goods or services they
have found emanate from an easily identifiable source when in
fact they do not.
B. U.S. Courts Unnecessarily Rely On The Broad and General
Language of the Federal Dilution Statute
The unclear and potentially broad scope of protection af-
forded by the Federal Dilution Act may easily be abused or
mistakenly relied on, as evidenced by the above U.S. decisions
prior to Ringling Bros. In the early cases in which federal
courts interpreted state dilution statutes, courts often sum-
marily found dilution based on the language of the statute
after determining that there is a likelihood of confusion.'96
Then later decisions used similar analyses, appropriate for
determining likelihood of confusion, to decide whether dilution
was likely to occur.'97
For example, the courts in the Panavision decisions relied
on dilution theory but based their reasoning on a traditional
infringement analysis, which requires consumer confusion as
to source of origin.' The Circuit Court found that the
defendant's actions "diluted" plaintiffs trademark because con-
sumers would expect that a cite with Panavision's name would
be owned by the Panavision company.'99 A fundamental re-
194. See id. at 271.
195. See id. at 273.
196. See Gemini Rising, 346 F. Supp. 1183. See also Pussycat Cinemas, 467 F.
Supp. 366.
197. See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, at 24-162.
198. See Panavision, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996). See also Panavision,
141 F.3d. 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
199. See Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1327.
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quirement for any injury to occur is that the consumer, when
accessing the cite, believe that she has reached Panavision's
cite."0 This is classic source confusion, and dilution theory
was not needed to grant Panavision relief.
The potential harm cited by the Circuit Court also re-
quires consumer confusion, and dilution theory is therefore
also mistakenly relied upon as grounds for relief. The court
cited the valid concern that the plaintiffs name and reputation
would be at the mercy of the defendant if consumers associated
Panavision with the messages on defendant's cite." 1 Again,
the fundamental requirement for the injury to occur is that the
consumer mistakenly perceives that the messages on
defendant's website are posted or authorized by the plaintiff. If
this were the case, once again the court would not need to rely
on dilution theory. Instead, there would exist a classic case of
infringement, in which the consumer mistakenly believed that
the plaintiff was the source of the information on the website.
Even more disturbing is the Massachusetts district court
decision in LP. Lund Trading APS, v. Kohler Co.,2 °2 where
the court relied on the language of Mead Data's six-factor test
to find evidence of potential dilution by blurring.0 ' The court
relied on Judge Sweet's test to determine whether dilution as
defined in 15 U.S.C. 11272" was likely to occur, even though
these factors are really more indicative of whether or not there
is a likelihood of confusion. 5
The Lund court not only offered protection under dilution
theory when there was actually evidence to support a finding
of likelihood of confusion. The reasoning suggests the court
was truly addressing an unarticulated concern with some other
form of unfair competition. The court offered protection be-
cause the trade dress of plaintiffs faucet "caused a lessening of
a demand for the product or services bearing the famous
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. 11 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Mass. 1998).
203. See id. at 127.
204. See discussion supra, p. 17 for the statutory definition of dilution.
205. See Port, supra note 9, in which the author compares the dilution factor
with the likelihood of confusion factors from the Second Circuit Polaroid case, and
finds the likelihood of dilution factors all present within the likelihood of confusion
factors. See also MCCARTHY, supra note 20, at 26-164.
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mark."' 6 Although it found that potential consumers were
sophisticated enough to know the source of the respective fau-
cets and not confuse them,0 7 the court found blurring be-
cause consumers "may buy the Falling Water, knowing they
are not getting a VOLA, but knowing too that they are getting
a product of similar quality, albeit one that has not been fea-
tured in MoMa, for less money, with lower search costs."20 8
This analysis extends trademark protection to senior owners
confronted with any effective competition. It provides the
plaintiff with a permanent monopoly over the shape of its
product even though the trade dress retained its ability to
signify the source of the faucet and the relevant quality associ-
ations. Although the court looked to 15 U.S.C. 1127 for the
definition of dilution0 9 (which admittedly offers little guid-
ance) it did not determine whether this perceived injury would
truly affect the ability of the mark to function as defined by
the statute. The court specifically found that the trade dress'
function as defined by the statue was not impaired, then still
offered protection under dilution theory.210
The Ringling Bros. court took a fundamentally different
approach when it required proof of actual dilution, including
causation and economic harm. By doing so, it remained faithful
to the language of the statute and created a stringent require-
ment to ensure that dilution claims are not used by companies
with famous marks to inhibit competition without proof of
quantifiable injury. By recognizing the difference between state
206. Lund, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 126.
207. This is factor three of Judge Sweet's test. See supra, note 123.
208. See Lund, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 125-26.
209. See text, supra, p. 18 for the definition.
210. The court found that potential customers for this high-end faucet were
sophisticated enough to distinguish between the faucets even though they looked
alike because it took a particularized interest to seek out this product. See Lund,
11 F. Supp. 2d at 125. If this were true, then it is hard to imagine how
defendant's use would truly harm the distinctiveness of the plaintiffs trade dress.
In addition, the court does not examine what kind of packaging and other marks
are used in conjunction with the shape of the faucet. If defendant's actions truly
impaired the ability of plaintiffs faucet to remain distinctive it seems necessary to
examine what other marks are used in conjunction with the shape of the faucet to
create this "distinctiveness." Based on the reasoning in the decision, it appears
that the court was more concerned with preventing defendant from free-riding on
plaintiffs efforts to establish a market for this particular faucet. Although this
may be a valid concern, it is not properly addressed by a preliminary injunction
for trade dress dilution.
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statutes which required only a likelihood of dilution and the
Federal Act which on its face requires actual dilution, it creat-
ed a workable standard for the practical application of a noto-
riously elusive concept. By requiring proof of injury and causa-
tion the court's interpretation limited the application of a con-
fusing legal standard that is easily abused. This standard will
force courts to define the actual injury requirement defined by
the statute."'
C. The Social Cost of Protection for a Likelihood of Dilution
Outweighs the Benefits
Because an injunction based on the likelihood of trade-
mark dilution protects against an injury that is speculative
and therefore immeasurable, the potential cost of this protec-
tion outweighs the benefit to plaintiffs. The cost of relief grant-
ed by U.S. courts that rely on the federal dilution statute to
provide protection for a likelihood of dilution outweighs the
benefit to the small number of plaintiffs who truly have a case
of trademark dilution. Because a likelihood of dilution produc-
es no quantifiable injury, it is difficult to prove.212 This is
particularly true in the case of a preliminary injunction pro-
ceeding, where plaintiffs may not have time to conduct a reli-
able consumer survey to prove that the mark's ability to signi-
fy a particular class or quality of goods has been or will be
eroded. Admittedly, plaintiffs will lose the ability to stop this
harm in its initial stages. But if true dilution has occurred,
then wider exploitation of the mark by the junior user will
inevitably lead to either sufficient dilution to be proved
through a survey, a likelihood of consumer confusion, or a
strong separate identity for the junior user. If consumers even-
tually become confused, then senior users will be able to sue
under traditional infringement theory. And if the junior user's
mark eventually develops a strong and separate identity, it
will not blur or tarnish the senior user's mark. 13 Finally, if
211. The statute requires a "lessening of the capacity of the mark to identify
and distinguish... ." As the Ringling Court noted, this standard requires more
than just a mental association between the two marks. See Ringling Bros., 170
F.3d at 453.
212. See Moskin, supra note 4, at 128.
213. For blurring or tarnishment to occur a consumer must, when confronted
with the junior user's mark, think of the senior user's mark and its relevant
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true dilution has occurred, a claimant can prove it by present-
ing reliable survey evidence.
In addition, the nature of the relief available under a like-
lihood of dilution standard effectively stifles competition at the
preliminary injunction stage. Manufacturers develop products
and packaging to be released by specific target dates based on
marketing research. When courts grant a preliminary injunc-
tion based on the general language of the dilution statute and
an incomplete understanding of the theory of dilution, they
delay the release and usage of the offending product or adver-
tisement until further proceedings to determine whether or not
a permanent injunction will be granted. Realistically, compa-
nies will be forced to settle, change their product or packaging,
or wait to release their product or advertising at a time when
it is no longer viable. Because of the potentially drastic effect
this could have on an emerging competitor, large companies
with sufficient resources may be able to squash competition by
bringing an action for a preliminary injunction in a court that
liberally applies a dilution statute. The underlying purpose of
trademark protection is to safeguard producers who invest in a
mark so that their goods are identifiable by preventing junior
users from subverting the function of the trademark by confus-
ing consumers," not to prevent competitors from entering
the market.
Finally, decisions based on a likelihood of dilution stan-
dard may provide an unnecessary reward to the owners of the
most notorious marks by protecting the mark even when there
is no damage to its function. As a result, trademark owners
with sufficient resources to make their mark "famous" can
secure a monopoly right in the words and images used to iden-
tify their products. The "trespass" theory of trademark in-
fringement, in which senior user's own the mark divorced from
its function will lead to anti-competitive results which under-
mine the policies of trademark law. Although it is argued that
trademarks now serve additional functions such as advertise-
ment,21 the relevance is that the advertisement evokes the
source and quality associations. If the junior user's mark develops a strong sepa-
rate identity, then the junior mark will call its own source and quality associa-
tions to mind.
214. See MCCARTHY, supra note 20.
215. See Vuk, supra note 1, at 877. See also Mostert, supra note 18, at 104.
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association of the source of the goods. Therefore, an integral
part of dilution is that it requires fame, however famous marks
will be protected by conventional infringement protection be-
cause junior marks that copy or imitate will inevitably be asso-
ciated with the senior user.216
As a result, courts in the U.S. and the EU should follow
the Ringling Bros. approach when providing protection for
dilution and require proof of causation and actual injury. EU
members could effectuate this change without amending the
legislation that implements the Directive. Article 5(2) of the
Directive applies to marks used on dissimilar goods. It allows
Members to provide protection where "use of that sign without
due cause takes unfair advantage, or is detrimental to, .the
distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark."217 Un-
like Article 5 (1), nowhere in section 2 is a "likelihood" men-
tioned.218 As a result, the language of the Directive appears
to require proof of actual dilution.
Although this approach will limit the misapplication of
dilution theory, it is unclear what evidence will sufficiently
prove actual dilution. The Ringling Bros. court found that
proof of mere association was not enough because it did not
sufficiently establish that the association caused harm to the
plaintiff's mark.219 The court found that "dilution by blurring
occurs only where consumers mistakenly associate or confuse
the marks and the goods or services they seek to identify and
distinguish, and this association causes actual harm to the
senior mark's capacity to 'identify and distinguish."" ° But
such proof seems more indicative of confusion than dilution.
Perhaps a well crafted survey could determine whether a
mark's ability to convey quality and attribute associations has
been damaged, regardless of whether the consumer is confused
about which product the mark signifies. Then, a plaintiff could
attempt to show that this loss resulted in decreased sales. If
shown, the decreased sales would be the result of a loss of the
mark's selling power regardless of consumer confusion. Such
216. See Reichman, supra note 2, at 5.
217. Directive, supra note 57, art. 5 § 2.
218. Article 5, § 1 of the Directive provides protection for a likelihood of confu-
sion, including association. See Directive, supra note 57.
219. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 453.
220. Id. (quoting and upholding the District Court decision) (emphasis added).
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survey evidence, although likely difficult to obtain, would mea-
sure the harm of trademark dilution, truly separate from con-
sumer confusion.
D. Dilution Theory Is Partially Based on Outdated.Concepts
Dilution theory is difficult to apply because it has devel-
oped from outdated concepts not relevant in today's modern
marketplace. From international scholars to U.S. Congress-
men, advocates of dilution protection argue that it is particu-
larly relevant with the emergence of a true global market,
221
when in reality the perceptions of consumers differ greatly
from when the theory was first developed. In 1927, Frank
Schechter argued that dilution protection would fill a gap in
trademark law.' He used examples like using Kodak on bi-
cycles or Rolls-Royce on radio parts.223 At the time of his arti-
cle, protection was not available unless the allegedly infringing
mark was used on similar goods, but today they would be ac-
tionable for creating source confusion." Even the concern
stated by Senator Leahy in the legislative history of the U.S.
Act 2" would be actionable under traditional source confusion
analysis.
In addition to the changes in the marketplace since the
emergence of Schechter's theory, there have also been signifi-
cant changes in the perceptions of consumers. Today, branding
is an increasingly important marketing device, and licensing
agreements are commonplace. It is not unusual or surprising
to find the name of famous clothing manufacturers on house-
wares or soft drinks on clothing, there is even an Ernest Hem-
ingway line of furniture.226 It is no longer necessarily unlike-
ly that a consumer would think that Kodak bicycles came from
the same source as Kodak cameras. Words and images are par-
ticularly powerful tools that are used to advertise and commu-
nicate27 and the available bank should not be depleted by
221. See statement of Sen. Leahy, supra note 128. See also Vuk, supra note 1.
222. See Schechter, supra note 12.
223. See Moskin, supra note 4, at 124.
224. See id. at 126.
225. See supra note 128.
226. See Liz Seymour, Design Notebook: Whipping Up Martinis and Home
Glamour, N.Y. TIMES, OCT. 8. 1998, at D1.
227. See Mostert, supra note 18.
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companies with sufficient resources to secure an unqualified
property right in words, numbers, or images.
Finally, the theories of tarnishment and blurring underes-
timate the ability of today's sophisticated consumer, who is
constantly bombarded with words and images meant to repre-
sent and reflect various brands and organizations, to differenti-
ate between the various stimuli. If consumers were truly un-
able to separate the associations between various stimuli
which are similar but known to be unconnected, then our daily
experience would be a constant "blur." Our inability to sepa-
rate a mental or emotional response to like stimuli would ren-
der branding and trademarking completely ineffective.
VI. CONCLUSION
Dilution protection is a largely unnecessary and costly
safeguard that can undermine the objectives of trademark law
by producing anti-competitive results. A likelihood of dilution
determination is conceptually difficult to apply and as a result
courts rely on it unnecessarily. In addition, the injury is specu-
lative and difficult to measure. Although it is possible for a
mark to be "eroded," it is inevitable that there will eventually
be confusion between the junior and senior marks, or sufficient
actual, quantifiable dilution. As evidenced by the English
court's decisions, senior users will still have the opportunity to
bring a claim under traditional infringement theory, and as
long as they can prove injury they will still be compensated.
The EU and the U.S. Congress should limit dilution pro-
tection to require proof of causation and injury and secure a
uniform system of trademark law that encourages competition
in the international marketplace. This interpretation comports
with the language of the U.S. statute and the EU Directive. In
the expanding fields of international and Internet commerce, it
is important for a uniform system of trademark protection to
be developed and implemented, so that manufacturers and
producers of new products can participate in the global mar-
ketplace without facing potential liability in select jurisdic-
tions. The United States and the European Union need a uni-
form system of trademark protection to facilitate international
commerce and insure a level playing field between nations and
market participants in the global marketplace.
William Marroletti
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